Post by coltnewservice45 on May 12, 2020 13:44:52 GMT -5
It is common for S&W K frame .357 barrels to fail through cracking at the 6 o'clock position over the barrel flat, where the section is thinner due to the clearance cut for the cylinder gas ring. This failure mode is less common in .38 Specials but was an issue with service weapons fired extensively with +P+LE loads.
In 1984 the USBP received 707 S&W revolvers that their weapons specialist at FLETC found major problems with. The INS Director of Training was informed that the revolvers could not be issued due to multiple major category defects.
The initial contract was a canned S&W document of simple description written specifically to disqualify the other two US revolver manufacturers. There was no performance requirement and no requirement for acceptance testing. The INS Director requested assistance from the US Army Materiel Command to provide a performance spec. which was already pre-existing and provided by the Army. Five "hard fitters" arrived from S&W, along with Dennis Lee S&W Fed Sales Rep and L Kwisnak who was in charge of QA for S&W. They worked on the pile of guns for a week and 34 guns had to be returned to the factory as beyond repair NIB.
The S&W reps requested an "exit interview" with USBP personnel and the Government's Contracting Representative. Attending were a BP Colonel, Major, Captain and their weapons specialist and the Engineering Test Director who had been detailed to FLETC from the Aberdeen Proving Ground.
S&W made their presentation. The BP gunsmith informed them the next contract would require a performance spec firing 10,000 rounds of 357 Magnum ammunition with no failures. Kwisnak of S&W spoke up and said no revolver now produced in the industry could meet such.
The Director then asked "how long a S&W would hold up?" Kwisnak of S&W clearly did not want to answer the question and finally said "3000 rounds." The BP Command Officers were all visibly shaken. The Director then asked what the failure mode was on the S&Ws. Kwisnak clearly did not want to answer and finally admitted, "the barrels crack". The BP Command Officers were NOT amused.
Finally Dennis Lee of S&W asked if there were further questions. The Government's contracting representative from Aberdeen Proving Ground asked Kwisnak what he meant by "crack?" and then asked specifically "was there loss of dispersion, loss of velocity or catastrophic failure," (the latter being what had been observed in the failed guns tested at Aberdeen Proving Ground).
Dennis Lee immediately said without answering the question they were late for their flight and the S&W folks all left quickly. The INS Director reviewed the "Confirmation of Information Understood" memo prepared by attendees and addressed to Kwisnak. The BP Command Officers had all come directly to him and reported what they heard and that they were NOT happy. The memo to S&W was in the PO before the S&W folks got to their flight in Jacksonville, being sent registered return receipt. The return receipt came back and no response was ever received from Kwisnak.
The next USBP contract contained a 10,000 round endurance requirement based on DR1187, the Federal Revolver Specification for .38 Special written by the US Army during the Vietnam war period, for purchasing revolvers intended for combat aircrews, security police and CID investigators, with changes to remove any references to Defense Contract Administration requirements and reflected that the ammo would be commercial 357 Magnum. Otherwise, it had the same mechanical/performance requirements as the existing Army .38 Special revolver spec. in use since the 1960s.
Low initial bid was S&W and testing commenced. At the end of the first evening both test samples submitted were "out of time" at 500 rounds. The BP weapons specialist installed a "oversize hand" and the next evening they shot another 500 rounds and the guns were out of time again, rebuilt again and they both took .099" hands to bring them into time. The third night another 500 rounds were fired and they were out of time again and the BP notified S&W the samples had both failed.
Ruger's Government Sale Rep Steve Vogel called me at Newport, NH and informed me that the USBP had referred him to contact specific named engineers at Ruger. As QA Manager I consulted the named engineers, referred the questions and relayed the answers back and Steve called the following morning providing the address of where test weapons were to be sent and that is how Ruger got invited to participate the competition.
The USBP had purchased 40,000 rounds of .357 Mag 158 Gr. JHP. All ammo was from the same manufacturer's lot per the spec. Ruger sent two Service Sixes with 4" barrels. Both guns met the performance spec and the Border Patrol later bought a large number of Rugers.
Steve Vogel requested copies of the FLETC test report both under FOIA and directly from USBP and later had a large number of copies run which Ruger sent out all over the world. Aberdeen Proving Ground soon afterward distributed copies to the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Naval Sea Systems Command, Department of State Security and Rock Island Arsenal.
A follow-on test was conducted for a plain-clothes, round-butt model with 3" barrel. INS investigators bought 500. The Brits also bought a large number as well.
About the time I left the company the Firearms Branch at FLETC had obtained one of the then-new GP100s and last I heard it had 15,000 rounds on it and was doing fine.
I heard later that S&W submitted its L frame, which passed and Ruger did as well so both were qualified and CBP bought low bid. Subsequently the L frame was found to exhibit a "design flaw" which necessitated a nationwide recall on the L frame to replace the striker nose with a smaller one and install a new recoil shield to correspond with smaller diameter striker nose. But in 20,000 rounds we shot up at Ruger testing our competitor's product we did not experience the reverse primer flow problem that led to the recall.
William C. (Bill) Davis of Tioga Engineering was contracted by S&W to determine what caused the reverse primer flow and determined what it was and thus the recall. As Bill explained to me, the hammer pivot pin was mis-located and even when the revolver met indent requirements it would not hold the pressure of full-charge .357 long enough for the pressures to relax. Thus the primer material flowed into the striker opening and locked the guns up to where they had to be beat open. About that time there was also an issue with the proofing and the government's QAR was sent to S&W to witness the repeat proof series after some guns were examined at Picatinny Arsenal and confirmed at the BATF laboratory by electron microprobe analysis of the powder residues, that the guns were not proof fired with six proof cartridges, one per each charge hole per the spec., but only one proof load and five regular service rounds.
In reproofing at S&W 1200 proof loads were fired in 200 guns and had 34 failures to fire. Per MILSPEC only one misfire per million is allowed. The misfired rounds were sent to Picatinny Arsenal and their analysis was the failure to fire resulted from excessive off center striker indents. The report obtained through FOIA indicated that was determined that firing pin off center hits in excess of .020" could lead to misfires. It was not uncommon at that time to see off center striker indents in S&Ws weapons upwards of .030" offset.
In the time I was QA Manager for the Newport facility I never saw a Ruger off that much.
In 1984 the USBP received 707 S&W revolvers that their weapons specialist at FLETC found major problems with. The INS Director of Training was informed that the revolvers could not be issued due to multiple major category defects.
The initial contract was a canned S&W document of simple description written specifically to disqualify the other two US revolver manufacturers. There was no performance requirement and no requirement for acceptance testing. The INS Director requested assistance from the US Army Materiel Command to provide a performance spec. which was already pre-existing and provided by the Army. Five "hard fitters" arrived from S&W, along with Dennis Lee S&W Fed Sales Rep and L Kwisnak who was in charge of QA for S&W. They worked on the pile of guns for a week and 34 guns had to be returned to the factory as beyond repair NIB.
The S&W reps requested an "exit interview" with USBP personnel and the Government's Contracting Representative. Attending were a BP Colonel, Major, Captain and their weapons specialist and the Engineering Test Director who had been detailed to FLETC from the Aberdeen Proving Ground.
S&W made their presentation. The BP gunsmith informed them the next contract would require a performance spec firing 10,000 rounds of 357 Magnum ammunition with no failures. Kwisnak of S&W spoke up and said no revolver now produced in the industry could meet such.
The Director then asked "how long a S&W would hold up?" Kwisnak of S&W clearly did not want to answer the question and finally said "3000 rounds." The BP Command Officers were all visibly shaken. The Director then asked what the failure mode was on the S&Ws. Kwisnak clearly did not want to answer and finally admitted, "the barrels crack". The BP Command Officers were NOT amused.
Finally Dennis Lee of S&W asked if there were further questions. The Government's contracting representative from Aberdeen Proving Ground asked Kwisnak what he meant by "crack?" and then asked specifically "was there loss of dispersion, loss of velocity or catastrophic failure," (the latter being what had been observed in the failed guns tested at Aberdeen Proving Ground).
Dennis Lee immediately said without answering the question they were late for their flight and the S&W folks all left quickly. The INS Director reviewed the "Confirmation of Information Understood" memo prepared by attendees and addressed to Kwisnak. The BP Command Officers had all come directly to him and reported what they heard and that they were NOT happy. The memo to S&W was in the PO before the S&W folks got to their flight in Jacksonville, being sent registered return receipt. The return receipt came back and no response was ever received from Kwisnak.
The next USBP contract contained a 10,000 round endurance requirement based on DR1187, the Federal Revolver Specification for .38 Special written by the US Army during the Vietnam war period, for purchasing revolvers intended for combat aircrews, security police and CID investigators, with changes to remove any references to Defense Contract Administration requirements and reflected that the ammo would be commercial 357 Magnum. Otherwise, it had the same mechanical/performance requirements as the existing Army .38 Special revolver spec. in use since the 1960s.
Low initial bid was S&W and testing commenced. At the end of the first evening both test samples submitted were "out of time" at 500 rounds. The BP weapons specialist installed a "oversize hand" and the next evening they shot another 500 rounds and the guns were out of time again, rebuilt again and they both took .099" hands to bring them into time. The third night another 500 rounds were fired and they were out of time again and the BP notified S&W the samples had both failed.
Ruger's Government Sale Rep Steve Vogel called me at Newport, NH and informed me that the USBP had referred him to contact specific named engineers at Ruger. As QA Manager I consulted the named engineers, referred the questions and relayed the answers back and Steve called the following morning providing the address of where test weapons were to be sent and that is how Ruger got invited to participate the competition.
The USBP had purchased 40,000 rounds of .357 Mag 158 Gr. JHP. All ammo was from the same manufacturer's lot per the spec. Ruger sent two Service Sixes with 4" barrels. Both guns met the performance spec and the Border Patrol later bought a large number of Rugers.
Steve Vogel requested copies of the FLETC test report both under FOIA and directly from USBP and later had a large number of copies run which Ruger sent out all over the world. Aberdeen Proving Ground soon afterward distributed copies to the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Naval Sea Systems Command, Department of State Security and Rock Island Arsenal.
A follow-on test was conducted for a plain-clothes, round-butt model with 3" barrel. INS investigators bought 500. The Brits also bought a large number as well.
About the time I left the company the Firearms Branch at FLETC had obtained one of the then-new GP100s and last I heard it had 15,000 rounds on it and was doing fine.
I heard later that S&W submitted its L frame, which passed and Ruger did as well so both were qualified and CBP bought low bid. Subsequently the L frame was found to exhibit a "design flaw" which necessitated a nationwide recall on the L frame to replace the striker nose with a smaller one and install a new recoil shield to correspond with smaller diameter striker nose. But in 20,000 rounds we shot up at Ruger testing our competitor's product we did not experience the reverse primer flow problem that led to the recall.
William C. (Bill) Davis of Tioga Engineering was contracted by S&W to determine what caused the reverse primer flow and determined what it was and thus the recall. As Bill explained to me, the hammer pivot pin was mis-located and even when the revolver met indent requirements it would not hold the pressure of full-charge .357 long enough for the pressures to relax. Thus the primer material flowed into the striker opening and locked the guns up to where they had to be beat open. About that time there was also an issue with the proofing and the government's QAR was sent to S&W to witness the repeat proof series after some guns were examined at Picatinny Arsenal and confirmed at the BATF laboratory by electron microprobe analysis of the powder residues, that the guns were not proof fired with six proof cartridges, one per each charge hole per the spec., but only one proof load and five regular service rounds.
In reproofing at S&W 1200 proof loads were fired in 200 guns and had 34 failures to fire. Per MILSPEC only one misfire per million is allowed. The misfired rounds were sent to Picatinny Arsenal and their analysis was the failure to fire resulted from excessive off center striker indents. The report obtained through FOIA indicated that was determined that firing pin off center hits in excess of .020" could lead to misfires. It was not uncommon at that time to see off center striker indents in S&Ws weapons upwards of .030" offset.
In the time I was QA Manager for the Newport facility I never saw a Ruger off that much.